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Abstract
An article devoted to the European Court of Justice’s (“ECJ” or the “Court”) judicial re-
view of the European Central Bank’s (“ECB”) level of constitutional autonomy and independence
may seem a bit arcane in a book dedicated to honor Advocate General Francis Jacobs upon his
retirement from the Court. The topic is, however, eminently suitable, because it highlights his
influence in a case remote from the many fields of law in which his impact has been so marked–
e.g., free movement of goods, competition law, trademarks and other intellectual property rights,
free movement of services and establishment rights, human rights protection, and taxation. This
Article will first discuss the high importance of the principle of independence for the ECB in its
control of monetary policy and the European currency, noting some aspects of the academic de-
bate concerning the appropriate level of such independence. The first section also observes that
a debate about the constitutional nature and autonomy of the ECB has become intertwined with
the appraisal of its level of independence. The Article then reviews the EC Treaty’s attribution
to the Court of jurisdiction within Monetary Union, including a power of judicial review of the
ECB’s status, measures and decisions. The following section sets out the conflict between the
Commission and the ECB in the OLAF case. The Article concentrates upon the text in Advocate
General Jacob’s opinion and the Court’s judgment concerning the constitutional status of the ECB
as an organ or body structured within the Community framework and concerning the scope of the
ECB’s independence. The final section provides several reflections upon the ultimate impact of the
judgment and opinion. The reflections stress the importance of the Court’s rejection of the ECB’s
claim to virtual autonomy in constitutional terms and the related subjection of the ECB to the rule
of law within the EC. The final commentary also considers the Court’s and especially Advocate
General Jacobs’ demarcation of the functional nature of the ECB’s independence. Advocate Gen-
eral Jacobs’ discussion of the value and extent of democratic accountability of the ECB is also
highlighted.
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INTRODUCTION
An article devoted to the European Court ofJustice's ("ECJ"
or the "Court") judicial review of the European Central Bank's
("ECB") level of constitutional autonomy and independence
may seem a bit arcane in a book dedicated to honor Advocate
General Francis Jacobs upon his retirement from the Court.
The topic is, however, eminently suitable, because it highlights
his influence in a case remote from the many fields of law in
which his impact has been so marked-e.g., free movement of
goods, competition law, trademarks and other intellectual prop-
erty rights, free movement of services and establishment rights,
human rights protection, and taxation.
Francis Jacobs wrote the Advocate General's opinion in the
Commission v. European Central Bank ("OLAF') case, a dispute be-
tween the Commission and the ECB.' The ECJ'sjudgment is an
important precedent in the constitutional law of Monetary
Union, and thus to some degree that of the European Commu-
nity ("EC" or the "Community"), because it clarifies the status of
the ECB as a Community institution, rejects an expansive ECB
claim of autonomy from the Community framework, and sets the
* Professor of Law & Director of the Center on European Union Law, Fordham
University School of Law.
1. See Commission v. European Central Bank, Case C-11/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-7147
[hereinafter OLAF]. The judgment has been analyzed in Nikolaos Lavranos, The Lim-
ited, Functional Independence of the ECB, 29 EUR. L. REv. 115 (2004), Okeoghene Odudu,
Commission v. European Central Bank, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1073 (2004), and in
Shaun A. Reader, Note, Moving Forward, Never Backwards: Preventing Fraud in the Euro-
pean Union and Defining European Central Bank Independence, 27 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 1509
(2004).
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parameters of the ECB's independence. As so often happens in
other fields, in this significant conflict the Court's judgment
agreed in all essential respects with the views enunciated by Ad-
vocate General Jacobs. As the eminent English authority, Profes-
sor Trevor Hartley, has well said, an Advocate General's opinion
can be regarded as the "starting point from which [the Judges]
begin their deliberations. In many cases they follow the advo-
cate general fully; in others they deviate from his opinion in
whole or in part. But always his views will be of great value."2
It is impossible for an outsider to evaluate the precise de-
gree of influence a salient analysis by an Advocate General may
have upon the ECJ during its deliberations. One can speculate
with reasonable certainty, however, that the Court is apt to weigh
more heavily a respected Advocate General's analytic probing of
the issues in a case that breaks new ground, that must be de-
cided without any significant recourse to precedent, and that
does not have the advantage of an initial Court of First Instance
("CFI") judgment on the same issues. In the OLAF case, all
three of these factors existed.
When the drafters of the Treaty of Maastricht3 set out the
structure and operations of the ECB, they did not formally add it
to the list of Community institutions in Article 7 of the Treaty
establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty")4 along
with the European Parliament, Council, Commission, ECJ, and
Court of Auditors. Nonetheless, the ECB may well be regarded
as so functionally vital to the Community in the monetary field as
2. TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 57 (5th
ed. 2003). Judge Nial Fennelly of the Supreme Court of Ireland, formerly a colleague
of Advocate General Jacobs, well describes the influence and the independence of Ad-
vocates General in Nial Fennelly, Reflections of an Irish Advocate General, 5 IRISH J. EUR. L
1509 (1996).
3. The Treaty of Maastricht, signed on Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719 both created the European Union and substantially amended the Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], changing its name to the European Commu-
nity Treaty ("EC Treaty"). Economic and Monetary Union became a component part
of the European Community ("EC" or the "Community") by virtue of the Treaty of
Maastricht. See DESMOND DINAN, EUROPE RECAST-A HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
233-64 (2004); see also GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN
UNION LAW 1205-13 (2d ed. 2002).
4. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art.
7, O.J. C 325/33, at 42 (2002) [hereinafter EC Treaty], as amended by the Treaty of
Nice, Feb. 1, 2003, O.J. C 80/1 (Mar. 10, 2001).
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to merit description as relatively comparable in importance to
the listed Community institutions (indeed, the draft Treaty es-
tablishing a Constitution for Europe' rather pragmatically
designates the ECB as a Union "institution" in Article 1-30, even
though it is not included in the traditional "institutional frame-
work" of the political institutions and the ECJ in Article 1-19).
Certainly, the ECB's operational role and powers far exceed
those of any agency or body within the European Community,
other than the formally listed institutions. The twelve Member
States currently in the Euro-zone6 have made an extraordinary
cession of sovereignty to the ECB. The ECB's Governing Coun-
cil' totally controls the monetary policy of those States and regu-
lates the use of the single currency, the Euro, within those States.
Moreover, the ECB's General Council,8 which includes national
central bank governors from all the Member States of the
Union, helps coordinate monetary policy throughout all these
States. In that context, the conflict between the Commission
and the ECB in the OLAF case may well be considered to be
almost as significant as an inter-institutional struggle between
two of the Community political institutions. Advocate General
Jacob's opinion and the Court's ultimate judgment accordingly
have constitutional dimensions as well as important operational
consequences for the ECB.
This Article will first discuss the high importance of the
principle of independence for the ECB in its control of mone-
tary policy and the European currency, noting some aspects of
5. Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, O.J. C 310/1
(2004) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Draft Treaty].
6. The Euro-zone (sometimes alternatively called the "Euro-area") is the common
term used to describe the Member States that have entered the final stage of Monetary
Union and transferred control of their monetary policy to the European Central Bank
("ECB"). The twelve Member States are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
7. The ECB's Governing Council is comprised of six Executive Board members,
including the ECB President, chosen for eight-year terms by common accord of the
governments of the Member States in the Euro-zone, together with the Governor of the
central bank of each State participating in the Euro-zone. See EC Treaty, supra note 4,
art. 112, O.J. C 325/33, at 78-79 (2002).
8. The ECB's General Council is composed of the President and Vice-President of
the ECB together with the Governors of the central banks of all the Member States,
both within and outside the Euro-zone. See Protocol on the Statute of the European
System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank art. 45, OJ. C 191/68 (1992)
[hereinafter ECB Protocol], reprinted in annex to Treaty of Maastricht, supra note 3, O.J.
C 224/1 (1992).
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the academic debate concerning the appropriate level of such
independence. The first section also observes that a debate
about the constitutional nature and autonomy of the ECB has
become intertwined with the appraisal of its level of indepen-
dence. The Article then reviews the EC Treaty's attribution to
the Court of jurisdiction within Monetary Union, including a
power of judicial review of the ECB's status, measures and deci-
sions. The following section sets out the conflict between the
Commission and the ECB in the OLAFcase. The Article concen-
trates upon the text in Advocate General Jacob's opinion and
the Court's judgment concerning the constitutional status of the
ECB as an organ or body structured within the Community
framework and concerning the scope of the ECB's indepen-
dence. The final section provides several reflections upon the
ultimate impact of the judgment and opinion. The reflections
stress the importance of the Court's rejection of the ECB's claim
to virtual autonomy in constitutional terms and the related sub-
jection of the ECB to the rule of law within the EC. The final
commentary also considers the Court's and especially Advocate
General Jacobs' demarcation of the functional nature of the
ECB's independence. Advocate General Jacobs' discussion of
the value and extent of democratic accountability of the ECB is
also highlighted.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL NATURE OF THE EUROPEAN
CENTRAL BANK ("ECB") AND ITS INDEPENDENCE
In an article dealing with the judicial delineation of the con-
stitutional nature of the ECB, with particular attention to an
analysis of its independence, one must regrettably assume that
the reader has some degree of familiarity with the nature of the
Monetary Union and the role of the ECB in controlling mone-
tary policy. Fortunately, many valuable books and articles de-
scribe and evaluate Monetary Union and the European Central
Bank.9 Certainly, the capital importance of Monetary Union is
9. Rene Smits, formerly the General Counsel to the Bank of the Netherlands, pro-
vides the best analysis of the ECB and Monetary Union before Monetary Union began.
See RENE SMITS, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (1997). The late Jorn Pipkorn, a mone-
tary specialist in the Commission Legal Service, gives an initial review in Legal Arrange-
ments in the Treaty of Maastricht for the Effectiveness of the Economic and Monetary Union, 31
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 263 (1994). For an American overview as Monetary Union com-
menced, see Roger J. Goebel, European Economic and Monetary Union: Will the EMU Ever
2006] 613
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signaled by the Treaty of Maastricht's insertion of "the economic
and monetary union" immediately following "a common mar-
ket" in the list of the Community's tasks in EC Treaty Article 2.10
Ever since 1999, when Commission President Jacques Delors, to-
gether with the governors of all the national central banks,
presented the Delors Report, a" which proposed the essential na-
ture and structure of Monetary Union, Monetary Union has
been viewed as an essential complement to the internal mar-
ket,12 providing major economic benefits to those States that
join in the final stage of Monetary Union.
Tide VII of the EC Treaty sets out in considerable detail the
structure and goals of the Monetary Union in Articles 98-124.
EC Treaty Articles 107 and 112, supplemented by a Protocol, de-
scribe the structure of the ECB itself and its central role in the
conduct of monetary policy within the European System of Cen-
Fly?, 4 COLUM.J. EUR. L. 249 (1998). Other valuable books include FABIAN AMTENBRINK,
THE DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY OF CENTRAL BANKS (1999); EMU: ASSESSING THE IM-
PACT OF THE EURO (Richard Baldwin et al. eds., 2003); EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MONE-
TARY UNION: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK (Mads Andenas ed., 1997) [hereinafter
EUROPEAN EMU]; LORENzO BINI SMAGHI & DANIEL GROS, OPEN ISSUES IN EUROPEAN CEN-
TRAL BANKING (2000); CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE (Jan Kleineman ed., 2001), EURO-
PEAN STATES AND THE EURO (Kenneth Dyson, ed., 2002); MALCOLM LEVrr & CHRISTO-
PHER LORD, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONETARY UNION (2000); CHIARA ZILIOLI &
MARTIN SELMAYR, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (2001).
10. Article 2 of the EC Treaty is the fundamental provision in the Title on Treaty
Principles, which lists all of the goals of the EC. See EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 2, O.J. C
325/33, at 40 (2002).
11. In June 1998, the European Council requested Commission President Jacques
Delors and a high committee composed of the Governors of all the central banks and
several eminent economists to propose a plan for a monetary union. The Delors Re-
port, delivered on April 17, 1989, set out virtually all of the essential features of Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union and a progressive mode of achieving it. The Delors Report
was specially published as the Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the Euro-
pean Community. See COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, RE-
PORT ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1989) [here-
inafter DELORS REPORT]. On the Delors Report's influence, see DINAN, supra note 3, at
237-38; Goebel, supra note 9, at 264-65; LEvrrr & LORD, supra note 9, at 47-50.
12. The program to achieve the internal market was launched by the Commis-
sion's June 1985 White Paper on Completing the Internal Market. See Commission of
the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the
Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310 Final (June 1985) [hereinafter
White Paper]. It was given Treaty effect on July 1, 1987, through the insertion of the
EC Treaty Article 14 (initially Article 8a) in the EC Treaty amendments known as the
Single European Act. The program transformed the EC in the late 1980s and paved the
way for the further modifications introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht, including
Monetary Union. See DINAN, supra note 3, at 205-31; see also BERMANN ET AL., supra note
3, at 540-48.
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tral Banks ("ESCB"), comprised of all of the national central
banks."t Article 110 sets out the scope of the ECB's regulatory
powers in its control of monetary policy. In what is termed the
final stage of Monetary Union, those Member States which have
satisfied several Treaty-defined economic conditions (the well-
known "convergence criteria") "join in transferring total control
of their monetary policy to the ECB. In May 1998, eleven Mem-
ber States joined in the creation of this so-called Euro-zone,'5
transferring control of their monetary policy to the Governing
Council of the Central Bank, which commenced this role on Jan-
uary 1, 1999.6 Although Denmark, Sweden and the United
Kingdom opted to remain outside of the Euro-zone,' 7 all of the
ten Central European and Mediterranean States that acceded on
May 1, 2004, intend ultimately to join it. 8 On January 1, 2002,
13. For an analysis, see SMITS, supra note 9, at 92-102, and ZILIOLI & SELMAYR, supra
note 9, at 53-90. See also Goebel, supra note 9, at 276-85.
14. The "convergence criteria" are the key economic and monetary conditions
that any Member State must fulfill, and which must be appraised as fulfilled by the
Council (in a special composition of the Heads of State or Government) before the
State can join the Euro-zone. These are set out in EC Treaty Article 121, supplemented
by Protocols. See SMITS, supra note 9, at 300-08. The well-known American economist,
Peter Kenen, appraises the "convergence criteria" in Peter Kenen, The Transition to
EMU Issues and Implications, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 359 (1998).
15. Following evaluation reports by the Commission and the European Monetary
Institute, on May 3, 1998, the Council, acting in the composition of Heads of State or
Government, decided that all of the eligible Member States other than Greece and
Sweden qualified to join the final stage of Monetary Union under Article 121. See Coun-
cil Decision, O.J. L 139/30 (1998). Greece subsequently qualified and joined on Janu-
ary 1, 2001. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 3, at 1919-20.
16. As mandated by EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 122, O.J. C 325/33, at 86-87
(2002). For a review of the ECB's initial operations by one of its most prominent Exec-
utive Board Members, see Otmar Issing, The ECB's Monetary Policy: Experience after the
First Year, 22J. POL'Y MODELING 325 (2000).
17. Denmark and the United Kingdom chose to remain outside the final stage of
the Monetary Union in virtue of Protocols annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht. The
Council concluded that Sweden did not fulfill the convergence criteria at the time of its
appraisal in May 1998, cited supra note 15. For a description of the legal status of
Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom as States remaining outside of the Euro-
zone, see BERMANN ET AL., supra note 3, at 1220-22.
18. When the ten new Member States acceded to the EC and the European Union
on May 1, 2005, the Treaty of Athens and its Act of Accession of April 16, 2003, O.J. L
236/17 (Sept. 23, 2003), did not provide for any of them to opt out of Monetary Union.
For a general review of the status of the new Member States, see Andrej Fatur, What
Challenges Do the Central European and Mediterranean States Face in Trying to Join the Third
Stage of European Monetary Union?, 28 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 145, 158-59 (2004), and Roger
J. Goebel, Joining the European Union: The Accession Procedure for the Central European and
Mediterranean States, 1 LoYoLA U. CHI. INT'L L. REv. 15, at 47-50 (2003-04).
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the common currency, the Euro, supplanted the national cur-
rencies of the twelve Euro-zone States.1 9 EC Treaty Articles 105
and 106 list the specific powers exercised by the ECB in its con-
trol of monetary policy and in the supervision of the Euro.9°
With regard to the constitutional status of the ECB, two ini-
tial comments merit highlighting. The first is that the 1990-91
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 2 1 that drafted the Treaty
of Maastricht decided to insert the Economic and Monetary
Union provisions in the EC Treaty, rather than creating Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union as a distinct separate structure, or
pillar, within the European Union, along with the Common For-
eign and Security Policy ("CFSP") and Cooperation in Justice
and Home Affairs ("CJHA").22 Hence Monetary Union does not
share the fundamental intergovernmental features of the CFSP
and the CJHA.
The second comment is that, despite the unusual length
and detail of the EC Treaty provisions concerning Monetary
Union, which suggests a highly autonomous character for the
Monetary Union, it is linked by the EC Treaty to the institutional
framework of the Community. Thus, the EC Treaty authorizes
19. The Euro commenced circulation in the Euro-zone States on January 1, 1999,
pursuant to the terms of Council Regulation 974/98 on the introduction of the Euro.
See Council Regulation No. 974/98, O.J. L 139/1 (1998). A Commission report pro-
vides a valuable overview of the successful introduction of the Euro. See Commission of
the European Communities, The Introduction of Euro Banknotes and Coins-One
Year After, COM (2002) 747 Final (Dec. 2002).
20. Pursuant to EC Treaty Article 105, the ECB conducts foreign exchange opera-
tions, manages the official reserves, and promotes payment systems in addition to the
power to "define and implement the monetary policy of the Community" (the Commu-
nity for this purpose is limited to the Euro-zone States by EC Treaty Article 132). See EC
Treaty, supra note 4, art. 105, O.J. C 325/33, at 75 (2002). The ECB also controls the
issuance of Euro banknotes under Article 106(1). See SMiTs, supra note 9, at 223-83.
21. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), only an
intergovernmental conference of representatives of the Member States can propose
amendments to the treaties. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European
Union art. 48, OJ. C 325/5, at 31 (2002) [hereinafter TEU]. The European Council
meeting at Madrid in June 1989 endorsed the Delors Report, and decided in its Decem-
ber 1989 meeting at Strasbourg to hold an intergovernmental conference to draft the
necessary Treaty provisions. See 12 E.C. BULL., No. 1, at 11-12 (1989); see also DINAN,
supra note 3, at 239-41; Goebel, supra note 9, at 265.
22. Distinct from the European Community, the Treaty on European Union (con-
solidated at O.J. C 325/5 (2002)), provides in Title V for modes of inter-governmental
action in Common Foreign and Security Policy and in Title VI for Police and Judicial
Cooperation in Criminal Matters. Only the Council has the power to act in those two
fields through special modes of Member State consensus or majority votes.
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the Council to legislate in certain sectors of Monetary Union,
especially to set both procedural and substantive ground rules
for certain aspects of ECB operations and for the creation and
use of the Euro as a currency.23 As we shall see, the Court's juris-
diction was also expanded to encompass issues arising in of out
of Monetary Union. Both of these observations are quite perti-
nent to our later consideration of the constitutional status of the
ECB. (The reference to the ECB's constitutional status is appro-
priate, because its nature, role and powers are set out in the EC
Treaty itself, which can only be modified by a Treaty amendment
ratified by all the Member States).
Turning to the topic of ECB independence, EC Treaty Arti-
cle 108 states the important principle that the ECB and the
ESCB shall have total independence in its monetary policy oper-
ations. The ECB and its individual members are categorically
forbidden to take instructions either from Community institu-
tions or from Member States. The national central banks which
join with the ECB in implementing monetary policy within the
ESCB are likewise to enjoy full independence from their respec-
tive governments.
At one stage during the IGC that drafted the Monetary
Union provisions in the Maastricht Treaty, France proposed that
the European Council should have the power to provide guide-
lines to the ECB,just as it does to the political institutions.24 The
proposal was not adopted. Article 108 makes crystal clear that
no Community political institution may provide any policy
guidelines to the ECB or exercise any control over its conduct of
monetary policy.
23. Thus, the Council may adopt legislation concerning the ECB's imposition of
penalties on enterprises under EC treaty Article 110(3), provide the ECB with powers
concerning the prudential supervision of financial institutions under Article 105(6),
determine the denominations and specifications of coins under Article 106(2), and set
guidelines for exchange rate policies under Article 111 (2). Probably the Council's
most crucial legislative act within the context of Monetary Union was the Council Regu-
lation No. 9764/98 on the Introduction of the Euro, supra note 19. See also Council
Regulation No. 2532/98 concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to im-
pose sanctions, O.J. L 318/4 (Nov. 11, 1998).
24. Alexander Italianer, a monetary consultant in the cabinet of Commission Presi-
dent Delors, wrote a useful survey of the IGC's drafting of the Monetary Union provi-
sions. SeeAlexander Italianer, Mastering Maastricht: EMU Issues and How They Were Settled,
in ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL POLIcy-MAKERS 51
(Klaus Gretschmann ed., Inst. of Pub. Admin., Maastricht 1993). For Italianer's discus-
sion of the French proposal, see id. at 69.
2006]
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No one questions that Article 108 was inserted into the
Treaty in order to ensure that the ECB had total autonomy in its
control of monetary policy in order to attain its "primary objec-
tive," stipulated in Article 105 to be the maintenance of "price
stability."25 The Treaty does not define the term, "price stabil-
ity," but it is commonly understood to mean economic condi-
tions in which consumer price inflation remains at tolerably low
levels.2 6 On October 13, 1998, just before the ECB commenced
its control of monetary policy in the Euro-zone on January 1,
1999, the ECB Governing Council set its own price stability tar-
get as consumer price inflation of below two percent within the
Euro-zone.2 7
The IGC's insertion of the principle of ECB independence
into the EC Treaty itself represented a major policy decision, be-
cause most national central banks had never been completely
independent of their governments, even if many enjoyed sub-
stantial operational autonomy, and because some Member States
were reluctant to allow the ECB and ESCB to enjoy total inde-
pendence from the Community's political institutions. The
principle of independence was strongly advocated by Germany,
whose Bundesbank traditionally enjoyed a high degree of inde-
pendence from its government, as critical in order to ensure that
the ECB and the ESCB would have the freedom to follow strict,
and hence sometimes unpopular, monetary policies.28 As for-
mer Bundesbank President Pohl asserted in justifying central
bank independence: "Only an independent institution is in a
position to resist the ever-recurring wishes of politicians to pre-
scribe monetary policy targets which are often inconsistent with
the objective of stability, such as the stabilization of exchange
rates or the promotion of growth and employment or the bal-
25. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 105, O.J. C 325/33, at 75 (2002). Article 105 then
sets out the ECB's secondary objective, namely, to "support the general economic poli-
cies in the Community," which, of course, are determined by the European Council
and the Community political institutions.
26. See SMITS, supra note 9, at 184-87; see also Goebel, supra note 9, at 279.
27. See Press Release, ECB, A Stability-Oriented Monetary Policy Strategy for the
ESCB (Oct. 13, 1998), available at http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/1998/html/
pr981013_.en.html (asserting that the Governing Council adopted this definition:
"Price Stability shall be defined as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonized Index of
Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%.").
28. See LEviTy & LoRD, supra note 9, at 120-21.
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ancing of regional disequalibria. "29
Accessory to the principle of independence of the ECB is
that of the independence of the national central banks and their
members, because the national central banks represent the
usual operational arm of the ESCB. Article 116(5) required
Member States to take action to ensure the independence of
their central banks during the second stage of evolution toward
Monetary Union, from January 1, 1994 to the end of 1998.0 All
the Member States, except Sweden, took the necessary action to
make their central banks independent by the end of 1997.1 Not
only is the principle of independence for the ECB and all na-
tional central banks participating in the ESCB given Treaty (or
constitutional) status in the EC Treaty, that status is stated in
very strong terms: Article 108 declares that members of these
bodies shall neither "seek or take instructions from Community
institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State,
or from any other body."32 Moreover, the Community institu-
tions and Member State governments pledge to "respect this
principle and not to seek to influence the members of the deci-
sion-making bodies of the ECB or of the national central banks
in the performance of their tasks"3 3 (the text is modeled upon
that in EC Treaty Article 21331 concerning the independence of
the Commission and its members-a provision of the initial
Treaty of Rome of March 25, 1957 that has never been
amended).
The decision to give the Executive Board members a non-
renewable, but relatively long eight year term, is generally be-
lieved to be intended to foster their independence.35 The IGC
apparently considered that any possibility of reappointment
29. Karl Otto Pohl, Basic Features of a European Monetary Order, in EuRoPEAN MONE-
TARY INTEGRATION 83 (Paul J.J. Welfens ed., 2d. ed. 1994).
30. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 116(5), O.J. C 325/33, at 81-82 (2002).
31. The Council Decision of May 3, 1998, so concluded in its review of the eligibil-
ity of each Member State. See Council Decision, supra note 15, O.J. L 139/30, at 34
(1998).
32. See EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 108, O.J. C 325/33, at 77 (2002).
33. See id.
34. See EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 213, O.J. C 325/33, at 120 (2002). The original
European Economic Community Treaty text may be found in 298 U.N.T.S. 11. The
current EC Treaty Article 213 was initially numbered as Article 157.
35. See SMITS, supra note 9, at 156 (suggesting that a bar to renewal "would free the
incumbent from political considerations concerning renewal of his or her term of of-
fice"). Cf Pohl, supra note 29, at 84.
2006] 619
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might open the way for undue influence by Member State gov-
ernments on Executive Board members interested in being reap-
pointed. 6 In contrast, German Bundesbank members serve
eight year terms and can be reappointed, but presumably the EC
Treaty authors considered that the Federal Reserve, whose mem-
bers serve fourteen year terms without the possibility of reap-
pointment, provided a better model.
Moreover, Article 11.4 of the Protocol on the Statute of the
ESCB and ECB provides that Executive Board members can only
be removed from office for incapacity or "serious misconduct"
through a proceeding before the Court of Justice, ensuring a
judicial rather than a political decision. 7 That article also pro-
vides that only the Governing Council or the Executive Board
can commence this judicial proceeding, further insulating Exec-
utive Board members from political influence, because no Com-
munity political body has the power to commence a removal
proceeding.
Another factor promoting the independence of the ECB is
that only the national central banks subscribe to its capital, pur-
suant to Article 28 of the above-referenced Protocol, and the
ECB derives its revenues solely through its own monetary opera-
tions, or through those of the national central banks operating
within the ESCB. The ECB is accordingly not in any way finan-
cially dependent on the Community's political institutions.
As noted above, Article 108's strong declaration of indepen-
dence for the ECB was presumably motivated by the EC Treaty
drafters' belief that the manifest success of the Bundesbank in
achieving a virtually continuous state of stable monetary condi-
tions, low inflation, and a solid currency was largely due to its
operational independence. Ludwig Erhard, the well known Ger-
man Economy and Finance Minister in the 1950s, later Konrad
Adenauer's successor as Chancellor, advocated a strong, inde-
pendent central bank. The Delors Report and initial Commis-
sion planning reports proposed that the ECB must be accorded
operational independence, and the IGC adopted this position
early on.3 8 Leading commentators applauded this decision. 9
36. See SMITS, supra note 9, at 163.
37. See ECB Protocol, supra note 8, art. 11.4.
38. See DELORS REPORT, supra note 11, at 26. The Report stipulated that the "ESCB
Council should be independent of instructions from national governments and Com-
munity authorities." Id. A Commission report of August 21, 1990 endorsed this view. See
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A legitimate question may, however, nonetheless be raised
as to the wisdom of incorporating the principle of independence
into the EC Treaty as a constitutional principle. As Professor
Francis Snyder and other commentators have observed,40 this
gives the ECB greater independence than the U.S. Federal Re-
serve Board and virtually all central banks prior to Monetary
Union. On a comparative note, the US Federal Reserve Board
obviously does not enjoy constitutional status and, although it
enjoys great independence by custom, nothing prevents the
Congress from adopting legislation mandating certain goals or
policies, a power that the Congress has on rare occasion exer-
cised.41 In the European context, the Bank of England and the
Netherlands Central Bank enjoyed a high reputation for their
efficacy in monetary control, even though each one's functional
independence was largely based on custom and each could be
subjected to binding instructions from the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer or the Ministry of Finance, respectively.42
Moreover, not all economists or academic commentators
agree with the view that a central bank must have total opera-
tional independence in order to be effective in controlling mon-
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIVTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTr-
TIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1990, at 30, 2 (1991). Note that the IGC com-
menced its work on the basis of a draft text proposed by the Commission on December
10, 1990 and that the provision on independence was the subject of early agreement.
See id. at 31, 1 4; see also Italianer, supra note 24, at 65-68, 80; SMrrs, supra note 9, at 160.
39. See, e.g., SMITS, supra note 9, at 152-60; Rosa Maria Lastra, The Independence of the
European System of Central Banks, 33 HARv. INT'L L.J. 475 (1992). For a more nuanced
view, expressing some concern over the total political independence of the ECB, see
Philip Brentford, Constitutional Aspects of the Independence of the European Central Bank, 47
INTL & COMP. L.Q. 75, at 105-09 (1998).
40. See Frances Snyder, EMU-Metaphor for European Union? Institutions, Rules and
Types of Regulation, in EUROPE AFTER MAASTRICHT 63, 78 (Renaud Dehousse ed., 1994);
see also Goebel, supra note 9, at 291; Matthias J. Herdegen, Price Stability and Budgetary
Restraints in the Economic and Monetary Union: The Law as Guardian of Economic Wisdom, 35
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 9, at 23 (1998).
41. The best known example is the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of
1978 (popularly known as the "Humphrey-Hawkins Act"), which required the Federal
Reserve to consider a variety of factors in setting its policies, notably "full employment
and production." See Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-523, Sec. 2(c), 92 Stat. 1887, 1889 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3101(c) (2000)). For an
account of the Federal Reserve's Congressionally mandated monetary policy goals in
contrast to the ECB's price stability objective, see Goebel, supra note 9, at 298-99.
42. The traditionally high regard accorded to the Bank of England's operational
control of monetary policy is well-known, but the Netherlands Central Bank also merits
high respect. See Laurence Gormley & Jakob De Haan, The Democratic Deficit of the Euro-
pean Central Bank, 21 EUR. L. Rv. 95, at 98-99 (1996).
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etary policy. Some commentators have contended that the polit-
ical institutions of government should have the power to set the
monetary policy goals for the central bank (as the U.S. Congress
has done for the U.S. Federal Reserve Board), or that in times of
political or economic crises, the political leadership should have
the capacity to overrule central bank decisions. Thus, Professors
Jakob de Haan and Lawrence Gormley have argued for func-
tional autonomy rather than strict independence, and approved
the New Zealand model in which the government joins with the
central bank in setting medium-term monetary policy goals.43
One of the leading academic commentators, Professor Rosa
Lastra, represents the more dominant view in support of a high
level of ECB independence, but in a nuanced manner. She con-
tends that central bank independence promotes price stability,
but that such independence must be balanced by democratic ac-
countability. Professor Lastra states the case for independence
as based upon
[T] he belief that central bankers, because of their specialisa-
tion and relative insulation from political pressures, are more
prepared than politicians to pursue the objective of price sta-
bility. The skills, expertise and superior qualifications of cen-
tral bankers compared to politicians recommend an indepen-
dent central bank, better able to guarantee a more objective,
more 'neutral' and faster decision-making process. This
'technical' argument assumes that the slow and heavy ma-
chinery of the government lacks the necessary flexibility and
swiftness to adapt to changing circumstances.44
Professor Lastra notes, however, that tax policy is firmly in the
hands of political leaders, even though a similar argument could
be made that tax policy should better be set by independent
technocratic experts.45
Moreover, Professor Lastra has subsequently endorsed the
view that at the time of an extraordinary political or economic
crisis, the political institutions of government should be able to
make the final determination of fundamental monetary policy,
pointing particularly to the Kohl government's decision to im-
43. See Jakob de Haan & Laurence Gormley, Independence and Accountability of the
European Central Bank, in EUROPEAN EMU, supra note 9, at 332.
44. Rosa Marla Lastra, European Monetay Union and Central Bank Independence, in
EUROP-AN EMU, supra note 42, at 289, 305.
45. See id.
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pose a one to one final exchange rate for the transfer of East
Marks for German Marks at the time of the reunification of Ger-
many in 1990.46 Despite the Bundesbank's public opposition to
giving the East Mark such a preferential rate, the Kohl govern-
ment gave priority to achieving greater popular support for
reunification in East Germany.
Certainly quite relevant in the academic debate is the view
of Professors Lorenzo Bini Smaghi and Daniel Gros that central
banks must enjoy functional credibility with financial and com-
mercial enterprises in order to conduct satisfactorily their mone-
tary policy operations.4 7 There is considerable plausibility in the
view that financial and other economic operators in the market-
place give more credibility to monetary policies set by an inde-
pendent central bank than those determined by a central bank
subject to political control or strong political influence.48
After the creation of the ECB, a new debate developed con-
cerning its constitutional or legal status within the EC (and in-
deed the European Union) with great relevance to the issue of
the appropriate level of ECB independence, as well as to the
OLAFjudgment, as we shall see. Chiara Zilioli, Deputy General
Counsel of the ECB, joined with a German academic, Martin
Selmayr, in launching the discussion with a 1999 article on the
ECB's role in external relations.49 Subsequently in 2000 they
provided a lengthy justification of their thesis in a prominent
article, ° followed by an extended treatment in their book on the
ECB published in 2001.51
Essentially Zilioli and Selmayr contend that the ECB is "an
independent specialized organization of Community law,"'5 2 one
that is "from a functional perspective . . . a new Community
within the European Union's central pillar which stands on
46. See Rosa Maria Lastra & Geoffrey P. Miller, Central Bank Independence in Ordinary
and Extraordinary Times, in CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at 31, 45.
47. See BINI SMAGHI & GROS, supra note 9, at 149-51.
48. See id. at 118-19; see also Issing, supra note 16, at 337-40.
49. See generally Chiara Zilioli & Martin Selmayr, The External Relations of the Euro
Area: Legal Aspects, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 273 (1999).
50. See generally Chiara Zilioli & Martin Selmayr, The European Central Bank: An
Independent Specialized Organization of Community Law, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 591
(2000).
51. See ZILIoLI & SELMAYR, supra note 9.
52. See Zilioli & Selmayr, supra note 50, at 621. The two authors' book on the ECB
recapitulates this contention. See ZILIOLI & SELMAYR, supra note 9, at 29.
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equal footing with the original three Communities" 53 -i.e., the
current European Community, the now expired European Coal
and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity. Moreover, they argue that the ECB is "not dependent
on the original [European Community], as it has received its
tasks, powers and duties directly from the Member States, not
from the Community institutions."54 This contention is presum-
ably founded on the fact that the creation of the ECB and the
grant of its powers and duties, stems from the Member States'
ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht, and not from any Com-
munity legislation. Further, "the ECB is not institutionally
linked to the Communities [and] it never acts as financial instru-
ment of the Community institutions or even for or on behalf of
them . . . as this would be incompatible with both its indepen-
dence and with its primary objective of price stability."55 While
thus denying that the ECB is legally subordinate to the political
institutions of the European Community, Zilioli and Selmayr ac-
cept that the ECB is "fully subject to the principles of primary
Community law and to the jurisdiction of the ECJ." 56
Based on this strikingly autonomous constitutional view of
the ECB, Zilioli and Selmayr emphasize that its "new form of
supranational central bank independence goes much further
than that of any of the ECB's historic ancestors," because it is
Treaty based, created by a "document of constitutional quality,"
rather than through any Community legislation.57
Not surprisingly, this rather absolutist theory of ECB auton-
omy and independence rapidly produced criticism from more
traditional academic scholars. Professor Ramon Torrent made
the first reply, contending that the ECB is simply "the Central
Bank of the European Community, no more, no less," not
"outside the Community," nor "outside the system of democrati-
cally organized political power. '5 8 Professors Fabian Amten-
brink and Jakob de Haan provided a different kind of rebuttal,
contending that the high level of independence accorded by the
53. See Zilioli & Selmayr, supra note 50, at 622.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 623.
57. Id. at 625.
58. Ramon Torrent, Whom is the European Central Bank the Central Bank of.: Reaction
to Zilioli and Selmayr, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1229, 1231, 1233-34 (1999).
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EC Treaty to the ECB did not represent any absolute "legal prin-
ciple," but rather a "conscious political choice."59 Without de-
bating the precise constitutional status of the ECB within the
Community, Amtenbrink and de Haan argue that in practice a
central bank cannot be completely depoliticized and that its in-
dependence must be balanced by a high level of democratic ac-
countability.6"
In any event, the thesis of Zilioli and Selmayr appears to
have considerably influenced the legal arguments presented by
the ECB in the OLAF case. The Court's ultimate judgment, and
even more the detailed opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, ac-
cordingly constitutes both a definitive legal assessment of the
constitutional nature of the ECB, as well as its level of indepen-
dence.
IX. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE'S ("ECJ")
JURISDICTION WITH REGARD TO THE ECB
In view of the ECB's vital role and great power in shaping
monetary policy for the Euro-zone Member States, as well as the
unusually high level of independence the EC Treaty accords to
it, the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty naturally found it essen-
tial to set out within the EC Treaty text a well-balanced structure
for the Court's jurisdiction in Monetary Union, including judi-
cial review of ECB acts and decisions. 61 The Maastricht Treaty
accordingly amended Article 230 to grant the Court's jurisdic-
tion over actions brought by Member States, the Council, the
Commission or private parties against the ECB in order to review
the legality of its acts.6 2 Similarly, under Article 232 the political
institutions, Member States or private parties can sue the ECB
for a failure to act to fulfill its duties.63 In Article 230 the draft-
59. Fabian Amtenbrink & Jakob de Haan, The European Central Bank: An Indepen-
dent Specialized Organization of Community Law-A Comment, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 65,
69-70 (2002).
60. Id. at 73-76.
61. For a description of the Court of Justice's jurisdiction in Monetary Union and
its power ofjudicial review of ECB acts and decisions, see SMITS, supra note 9, at 106-10.
For a brief summary, see Goebel, supra note 9, at 295-96. See generally Paul Craig, EMU,
the European Central Bank and Judicial Review, in PAUL BEAUMONT & NEIL WALKER, LEGAL
FRAMEWORK OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN CURRENCY (1999) (providing an academic ex-
perts' analyses on the topic).
62. See EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 230, O.J. C 325/33, at 126 (2002).
63. See id. art. 232, at 127.
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ers balanced this judicial review of the ECB by granting the ECB
the power to sue the Community political institutions in order to
protect its "prerogatives. '"64 The Maastricht Treaty also amended
Article 234 to include the acts of the ECB among those which
may be the subject of questions referred to the Court of Justice
by national courts.6 5 Finally, the Court of Justice under Article
237(d) was given the power to review the compliance of national
central banks with their obligations in the ESCB and to compel
their compliance if necessary.66
It is likely that private parties, even in the financial sector,
would rarely have recourse to a legal challenge of an ECB regula-
tory decision (although appeals to the Court of Justice are now
expressly provided for in certain regulatory legislation).67 Also,
the Court is certain to give a broad field of discretion to the ECB
when it adopts monetary measures. Nonetheless, the possibility
of review by the Court of Justice should serve as a restraint
against arbitrary, poorly reasoned or inadequately justified rules
or decisions, in line with well-established Court precedents on
the need for a reasoned basis for Council, Commission and Par-
liamentary acts.6 8 Although the Court of Justice has not yet had
to decide any appeals of ECB decisions in the financial sector,
the Court of First Instance has had occasion to review, and af-
firm, the ECB's dismissal of a staff member for misconduct.69
In addition to any appeals of ECB regulatory decisions or
measures, it was always likely that the Court ofJustice might have
to decide disputes over the extent of ECB competence or power
64. See id. art. 230, at 127-28.
65. See id. art. 234, at 127.
66. See id. art. 237(d), at 128.
67. See, e.g., Council Regulation No. 2532/98, OJ. L 318/4 (Nov. 11, 1998) (con-
cerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions). Regulation
2532/98 regulates in Article 1 the maximum level of ECB fines or periodic penalty
payments on undertakings that violate ECB regulations or decisions, sets various proce-
dural rules in Articles 2-4, and prescribes judicial review by the Court ofJustice in Arti-
cle 5.
68. The Court ofJustice's doctrine in this regard developed early. See Commission
v. Germany (Brennwein), Case 24/62, [1963] E.C.R. 63; see also Groupement des
Fabricants de Papiers Peints de Belgique v. Commission, Case 73/74, [1975] E.C.R.
1491. The obligation to state sufficient reasoning applies also to Council regulations.
See Beus GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollant Munchen, Case 5/67, [1968] E.C.R. 83.
69. See X v. European Central Bank, Case T-333/99, [2001] E.C.R. 11-302. It is
noteworthy that the Court of First Instance held that it had initial jurisdiction over cases
involving the staff of the ECB even though Article 230 refers only to Court of Justice
jurisdiction over the ECB.
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in conflicts with Community institutions or national central
banks or ministries of finance (such conflicts are sometimes
called "turf battles"). Accordingly, that the Court should have to
decide the constitutional nature of the ECB and the parameters
of ECB independence in the OLAF proceeding is not really sur-
prising.7 ° As noted before, the ECB is certainly a powerful mon-
etary institution or body (even if not formally made a Commu-
nity institution by the EC Treaty), so that a conflict between the
ECB and the Commission is inevitably of high significance.
The Court of Justice is keenly aware of the capital impor-
tance of its judgments in inter-institutional conflicts. If such
conflicts could not be resolved by a neutral judicial forum, they
would create the risk of ongoing combat between the institu-
tions involved, handicapping each one's operational efficiency
and jeopardizing healthy collaboration. The Court regards its
own role in finding an appropriate solution to inter-institutional
combats as one flowing from its mandate under EC Treaty Arti-
cle 220 to "ensure that in the interpretation and application of
this Treaty the law is observed."'"
Although disputes between the Parliament and the Council
over their respective prerogatives are undoubtedly more signifi-
cant than the conflict between the Commission and the ECB in
the OLAF case, the Court's comments in the famous Post-
Chernobyl judgment are quite relevant here:
The Treaties set up a system for distributing powers among
the different Community institutions, assigning to each insti-
tution its own role in the institutional structure of the Com-
munity and the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the
Community. Observance of the institutional balance means
that each of the institutions must exercise its powers with due
regard for the powers of the other institutions. It also re-
quires that it should be possible to penalize any breach of
that rule which may occur. The Court, which under the Trea-
ties has the task of ensuring that in the interpretation and
application of the Treaties the law is observed, must therefore
be able to maintain the institutional balance .... 72
70. See Goebel, supra note 9, at 295 (predicting such "turf battles," even noting that
"it is not inconceivable that the precise parameters of ECB independence may have to
be settled by the Court.")
71. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 220, O.J. C 325/33, at 122 (2006).
72. Parliament v. Council, Case C-70/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2041, 21-23, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 91, 115 [hereinafter Post-Chernobyl] (paragraph numbers omitted).
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III. THE OLAF JUDGEMEAT: BACKGROUND
At the heart of the OLAF case is the question whether the
ECB's Decision 1999/726,73 creating its own internal procedures
to combat fraud, violated the rules laid down in Regulation
1073/1999, which authorized the Anti-Fraud Office ("OLAF") to
exercise its investigative powers in internal reviews of all Com-
munity institutions, agencies, and bodies. 4
Resolution of this rather technical question required Advo-
cate General Jacobs and the Court to examine the constitutional
nature of the ECB and the scope of its independence, as well as
several related issues, notably the extent of its right to be con-
sulted during the legislative process for measures that might af-
fect it. Without any doubt, even though the ECB fully under-
stood the desirability of effective anti-fraud action, it believed
that its autonomous status and operational independence might
be jeopardized if it subjected itself to OLAF investigations.
To fully understand the vigor of the Commission's chal-
lenge of the ECB position, one must realize that efforts to com-
bat fraud and financial misconduct within the Community are
not only important because of past wrong-doing7" but also be-
cause of the political sensitivity of the subject. On March 16,
1999, President Santer and the entire Commission felt obliged
to resign following a report by a Committee of Independent Ex-
perts which concluded that two Commissioners, Cresson and
Wulf-Mathies, had engaged in favoritism and financial miscon-
duct, and that the Commission as a whole had failed in its duty
to properly supervise financial procedures, combat fraud and
mismanagement, and police the conduct of its members.7 6 It is
73. See European Central Bank Decision No. 1999/726/EC, O.J. L 291, at 36
(1999) [hereinafter ECB Anti-Fraud Decision].
74. See Council Regulation No. 1073/1999, O.J. L 136/1 (1999) [hereinafter
OLAF Regulation].
75. For a description of the high level of fraud and corruption in Community op-
erations, and the consequent Commission efforts to combat this fraud and corruption,
see Reader, supra note 1, at 1521-22.
76. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTVITIES OF THE EURO-
PEAN UNION 1999, at 403-04, 1032 (2000) [hereinafter GENERAL REPORT 1999]. The
Committee of Independent Experts, directed by a Parliament resolution in January
1999, presented its First Report on Allegations regarding Fraud, Mismanagement and
Nepotism in the European Community on March 15, 1999. See id, at 426-27, 1092; see
also BERMANN ET AL., supra note 3, at 44; Reader, supra note 1, at 1522-24.
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probable that the Parliament would have censured the Commis-
sion and forced its resignation if it had not resigned voluntarily.
The Commission, led by President Prodi, that the Member
State political leaders chose to complete the final months of the
Santer Commission's term and then the full 1999-2004 term, nat-
urally considered efforts to combat financial misconduct and
fraud a priority matter.77 Moreover, Commission and other re-
ports, since the late 1990s have indicated that fraud and corrup-
tion in connection with the grant of agricultural subsidies and
the grant of regional and infrastructure aid, as well as in other
fields, represents a constant ongoing problem, costing huge
sums annually.7 8
Accordingly, on April 28, 1999, by Decision 1999/352, 79 the
Commission created OLAF to carry out the administrative inves-
tigations necessary to combat "fraud, corruption and any other
illegal activity adversely affecting the Community's financial in-
terests."8" The Commission delegated its own antifraud powers
to OLAF to achieve this. It is worth underlining that Article 3 of
the Decision declared that OLAF should have "complete inde-
pendence" from the Commission itself, as well as any other insti-
tution or any Member State.81
Recognizing the need to reinforce Community efforts to
combat fraud and corruption, the Member States amended the
EC Treaty through the Treaty of Amsterdam to insert Article
280(4)2 within the Title on Financial Provisions (which essen-
tially dealt with the EC budget). Treaty Article 280(4) is a grant
of power to legislate in the "fight against fraud affecting the fi-
77. See GENERAL REPORT 1999, supra note 74, at 427, 1093.
78. See, e.g., OLAF Supervisory Committee Progress Report No. 1/1999, O.J. C 360,
at 1 (2000) (describing the history of fraud in the Community prior to the creation of
OLAF). In his Opinion at paragraph three, Advocate General Jacobs cited an estimate
that fraud and irregularities in 2000 exceeded two billion Euros. Opinion of Advocate
GeneralJacobs, Commission v. European Central Bank, Case C-11/00, [1980] E.C.R. I-
7155, 1-7157, 3 (hereinafter A.G. Jacobs OLAF Opinion).
79. See Commission Decision No. 99/352/EEC, O.J. L 136/20 (1999) [hereinafter
Commission OLAF Decision].
80. See id. at 21, art. 2(1)(a).
81. See id. at 21, art. 3.
82. See EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 280(4), O.J. C 325/33 (2002), at 146. The EC
Treaty as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, but prior to the Treaty of Nice, is
published in consolidated form in O.J. C 340/173 (Nov. 10, 1997) (effective May 1,
1999).
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nancial interests of the Community." 3 With extraordinary ra-
pidity, almost immediately after the Treaty of Amsterdam be-
came effective on May 1, 1999, the Parliament and the Council,
acting by codecision, adopted Regulation 1073/1999, popularly
called the OLAF Regulation, providing OLAF with full powers to
carry out anti-fraud and corruption investigations.8 4
Article 1 of the Regulation authorized OLAF to exercise its
investigative powers "within the institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies established by, or on the basis of, the Treaties," thus
prescribing the fundamental scope for OLAF's activities.8 5 Arti-
cle 4 on Internal Investigations stipulated that OLAF's investiga-
tions should be carried out "under the conditions and in accor-
dance with the procedures provided for in this Regulation and
in decisions adopted by each institution, body, office and
agency.'8' Article 4 thus foresaw that the Community institu-
tions (including the Court of Justice), as well as all Community
agencies and bodies, would collaborate with OLAF to set out
procedural arrangements for OLAF investigations. Article 4 also
provided that OLAF should have "the right of immediate and
unannounced access to any information held by the institutions,
bodies, offices, and agencies, and to their premises," a right to
inspect accounts and take documents, and the power "to request
oral information" from staff. Finally, each Community institu-
tion, agency or body must adopt a decision placing "a duty"
upon its managers and staff to "cooperate with and supply infor-
mation" to OLAF. 7
Although the ECB was well aware of the adoption in May of
the OLAF Regulation, on October 7, 1999 the ECB adopted its
own Decision 1999/726 concerning fraud prevention.88 Mani-
festly, the ECB believed (presumably in good faith) that OLAF's
investigatory powers pulsuant to the Regulation did not apply to
it, and accordingly wanted to create its own internal anti-fraud
procedures.
The ECB Decision authorized its Directorate for Internal
Audit to carry out administrative investigations to combat fraud
83. See id.
84. See OLAF Regulation, supra note 74, O.J. L 136/1 (1999).
85. See id. at 3, art. 1(3).
86. See id. at 4, art. 4(2).
87. See id. at 4, art. 4(6)(a).
88. See ECB Anti-Fraud Decision, supra note 71, OJ. L 291/36 (1999).
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and other financial misconduct. The Directorate was instructed
to create a special ECB Anti-Fraud Committee consisting of
three independent outside persons, appointed to three year
terms by the Governing Council, who would have total indepen-
dence from the ECB, as well as other Community institutions or
bodies or any Member State government.89 Article 5 of the ECB
Decision required ECB staff to inform the Anti-Fraud Commit-
tee of any "fraud or illegal activities detrimental to the financial
interests of the EC."90 The only reference to OLAF in the Deci-
sion is a provision requiring the Anti-Fraud Committee to main-
tain "relations" with the Supervisory Committee of OLAF.91
On January 14, 2000, acting on behalf of OLAF's interests,
the Commission sued the ECB to annul its Decision. The Com-
mission, supported by the Council, maintained that the OLAF
Regulation gave OLAF investigatory power over the ECB, just as
it did over any other Community body or agency. The Commis-
sion further contended that the ECB Decision was incompatible
with the provisions of the OLAF Regulation.
In its defense, the ECB contended that its Treaty-guaran-
teed status, in particular its guarantee of independence, insu-
lated it from the jurisdiction of OLAF pursuant to Regulation
1073/1999. The ECB also maintained that the EC Treaty
granted the ECB a legally autonomous status quite distinct from
that of a Community agency or body, and that its budget, reve-
nues and financial operations were quite separate and distinct
from those of the Community, so that the Regulation simply did
not apply to it. The ECB next argued at length that its Treaty-
guaranteed independence would be violated by being subject to
OLAF investigations. The ECB further maintained that its right
to be consulted on Community acts "in its fields of competence"
under EC Treaty Article 105(4) had been violated when the Par-
liament and Council had adopted the Regulation, which accord-
ingly nullified the Regulation's scope in its regard. Finally, even
if the Court should find that the ECB was subject to OLAF inves-
tigations, the ECB contended that its fraud prevention Decision
was not incompatible with the OLAF Regulation.
89. Id. at 36, art. 1.
90. Id. at 36, art. 5.
91. Id. at 36, art. 1(9).
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Advocate General Jacob's Opinion of Oct. 3, 200292 rejected
all of the ECB contentions, decisively asserting that the ECB's
constitutional nature is that of a Community organ or body
within the European Community structure, not some sort of au-
tonomous supra-national organization. He further reasoned
that the Treaty grant of independence covers only the ECB's
conduct of monetary policy and does not preclude the ECB's
subjection to general Community rules to combat fraud, espe-
cially when carried out by OLAF, which is itself operationally in-
dependent of the political institutions. He also concluded that
the ECB's right to be consulted under Article 105(4) during a
Community legislative process would only arise when the draft
legislation concerned the ECB's monetary policy-making and re-
lated operational tasks, or when its internal staff structure would
be affected. Finally, Advocate General Jacobs also concluded
that the ECB's anti-fraud procedures pursuant to its Decision
would tend to frustrate the effective exercise by OLAF of its in-
vestigatory powers, so that the Decision must be struck down.9"
The Court plenary judgment of July 10, 2003, written by Judge
Antonio La Pergola,94 well known for his constitutional exper-
tise, reached essentially the same conclusions as did Advocate
General Jacobs, although more briefly and in more general
terms.
IV. THE OLAF JUDGEMENT: THE INTERTWINED ISSUES OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL NATURE OF THE ECB AND
ITS INDEPENDENCE
Undoubtedly, the most important issue of principle in-
volved in the case was that of a possible violation of the indepen-
92. A.G. Jacobs OLAF Opinion, Case C-11/00, [1980] E.C.R. 1-7155.
93. This article will not deal with this final aspect of the OLAF case, nor with a
number of procedural issues, such as admissibility, or the issue of proportionality. For
discussion of this topic see Odudu, supra note 1, at 1078-80, 1083-91, and Reader, supra
note 1, at 1509.
94. OLAF, Case C-11/00, [2003] ECR 1-7147, 1-7215. Judge Antonio La Pergola
served on the Italian Constitutional Court before coming to the Court of Justice, serv-
ing as Advocate General from 1995 to 1999 andJudge since then. It is perhaps neces-
sary to note that Court of'Justice judgments are written by a ReportingJudge to reflect
the views of the entire Court and are not the personal opinion of the author. Obvi-
ously, however, a Reporting Judge's opinion will heavily influence the entire Court's
final judgment. Former Judge David Edward describes the deliberative process of the
Court in formulating its judgment in David 0. Edwards, How the Court ofJustice Works, 20
EUR. L. REv. 539, at 555-57 (1995).
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dence guaranteed by EC Treaty Article 108 to the ECB. To a
considerable degree, this issue was intertwined with a prelimi-
nary consideration of the nature and status of the ECB within
the constitutional order of the European Community.
A. The Constitutional Status of the ECB
The initial premise of the ECB was that it should not be
deemed to be simply a "body" within the European Community.
Rather, the ECB contended that the EC Treaty itself created the
ECB and give it a legal personality distinct from the European
Community. Further, the EC Treaty itself provided the ECB
with "its own internal decision-making bodies [which] have been
granted original powers under the Treaty to adopt legally bind-
ing measures."95 The ECB thus emphasized the autonomous
policy and regulatory powers of its Governing Council and Gen-
eral Council. Finally, "the ECB is to act independently of the
Community institutions in the execution of its tasks."96
Presumably this ECB proposed description of its nature
owes considerably to the thesis of Zilioli and Selmayr that the
ECB is a "supranational organization" distinct from the Euro-
pean Community.97 Without necessarily fully accepting that pro-
position, if the Court were to accept that the ECB is not legally to
be characterized as a "body" or "agency" within the Community,
then it would escape coverage under the OLAF Regulation, be-
cause the Regulation is expressly stated to apply to Community
institutions, agencies and bodies.
Advocate General Jacobs decisively rejected this view of the
constitutional nature of the ECB. He began by observing that
the Treaty draftsmen had deliberately inserted the Monetary
Union provisions within the European Community Treaty, not
in a distinct pillar within the Treaty on European Union.98 Ac-
cordingly, "the ECB forms an integral part of the Community
framework."99 For Advocate General Jacobs, the ECB is an or-
ganic constituent part of the Community:
95. A.G. Jacobs OLAF Opinion, Case C-11/00, [1980] E.C.R. at 1-7174, 55.
96. Id.
97. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
98. See A.G. Jacobs OLAF Opinion, Case C-11/00, [1980] E.C.R. 1-7155, 1-7174,
57.
99. Id. at 1-7175, 1 60.
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The ECB is subject to the general principles of law which
form part of Community law and promotes the goals of the
Community set out in Article 2 EC though the implementa-
tion of the tasks and duties laid upon it. It may therefore be
described as the Central Bank of the European Community;
it would be inaccurate to characterize it, as have some writers,
as an organisation which is 'independent of the European
Community', a 'Community within the Community', a 'new
Community' or, indeed, as something falling outside the no-
tion of a body established by, or on the basis of, the EC Treaty
in Regulation No 10763/1999.00
Dealing with this initial key issue concerning the constitutional
nature of the ECB, the Court of Justice more laconically fol-
lowed the analysis of Advocate General Jacobs, stating that "re-
gardless of the distinctive features of its status within the Com-
munity legal order, the ECB was indeed established by the EC
Treaty."10 1 Because the OLAF Regulation by its terms covered
all the Community's "institutions, bodies, offices and agencies,"
it would also encompass the ECB." 2
Later we will reflect upon the significant consequences of
the designation of the ECB as an integral component of the Eu-
ropean Community. In passing we should briefly note that the
ECB raised two other issues of Treaty interpretation that relate
to its status.
First, the ECB argued that its budget, financial resources
and expenses were totally autonomous, based upon grants of
power under the EC Treaty or the Protocol on the Statute of the
ESCB and ECB.'0 3 Article 280(4), which granted the Commu-
nity the legal competence to adopt the OLAF Regulation, ex-
pressly authorizes action to combat "fraud affecting the financial
interests of the Community." The ECB claimed that its revenue
and expenditures are outside "the financial interests of the Com-
munity. ' '
Certainly this view might be plausible if one accepted the
ECB's initial premise of its autonomous character, but becomes
100. Id.
101. OLAF, Case C-11/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-7147, 1-7246, & 64.
102. Id. at 1-7247, 65-67.
103. A.G.Jacobs OLAFOpinion, Case C-11/00, [1980] E.C.R. at 1-7189-90, 11 113-
14.
104. Id. at 1-7189, 113.
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implausible as soon as it is deemed to be a Community organ or
body. Advocate General Jacobs observed that Article 280(4)
should be construed in a broad sense to cover any financial in-
terests of a Community body,"'5 even if there exists "a degree of
separation between the finances of the ECB" and the rest of the
Community. 10 6 He concluded that "[s]ince it is a Community
body, the financial interests of the ECB are part and parcel of
the financial interests of the Community."1
0 7
The Court agreed with the Advocate General. In its analy-
sis, the Court remarked notably that the ECB "falls squarely
within the Community framework"'0 8 because its basic purpose
is to further the objectives of Monetary Union, one of the key
Community objectives in EC Treaty, Article 2. For the Court, the
financial resources of the ECB represent "a particular and direct
financial interest for the Community," just as those of any other
"body, office or agency [which] owes its existence to the EC
Treaty"."'
Secondly, the ECB contended that the OLAF Regulation
could not be applied to it because the Parliament and Council
had failed to consult the ECB during its drafting in violation of
Article 105(4), requiring that the ECB be consulted on any pro-
posed Community act in its field of competence.1 0 The ECB
specifically contended that if the OLAF Regulation should be
deemed to apply to it, then the ECB should have been consulted
concerning the Regulation's impact on the ECB's power to or-
ganize its staff rules and other internal affairs."'
In Advocate General Jacobs's valuable analysis:
Article 105(4) EC must be interpreted as applying to pro-
posed measures which are concerned with the issues covered
by Article 105(2) EC (monetary policy, foreign exchange op-
erations, management of foreign reserves and payment sys-
105. See id. at 1-7191-92, 1 117-20. Advocate GeneralJacobs expressly rejected the
ECB contention that Article 280(4)'s scope should be limited to the Community
budget. See id. at 1-7192, 1 120.
106. Id. at 1-7192-93, 122.
107. Id.
108. OLAF, [2003] E.C.R. at 1-7254, 92.
109. Id. at 1-7253, 91.
110. See EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 105(4), O.J. C 325/33, at 75-76 (2002) (ex
Article 105).
111. See A.G. Jacobs OLAF Opinion, Case C-11/00, [2003] E.C.R. at 1-7193-94, 77
126-27.
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tems) and, perhaps, by Article 105(5) and (6) EC (prudential
supervision) and Article 106 EC (issue of bank notes and
coins). 1 12
He added that:
The consultation envisaged by that provision aims, in my
view, to ensure that the legislature is well informed when it
adopts measures relating to subjects of which the ECB has
particular knowledge or expertise, in particular, monetary
policy. Thus, the involvement of the ECB under Article
105 (4) EC seeks to enhance the quality of Community legisla-
tion to the advantage of the European polity as a whole; it is
not designed to protect the interests of the ECB, or to give
the ECB a voice over all measures which are capable of affect-
ing its internal organization."
1 3
Given this functional limitation of the sense of the phrase,
"in its fields of competence," the legislative adoption of the
OLAF Regulation was manifestly too remote from monetary pol-
icy to have required ECB consultation. 1 4 The Court approv-
ingly cited the Advocate General's opinion, noting that the pur-
pose of Article 105(4) is to enable consultation concerning legis-
lation whenever the ECB "by virtue of the specific function that
it exercises in the Community framework ... and by virtue of the
high degree of expertise that it enjoys, is particularly well placed
to play a useful role in the legislative process envisaged."'1 5
B. The Independence of the ECB
We turn now to the most prominent issue of the OLAF case,
namely, the nature and extent of the ECB's independence. The
112. Id. at 1-7196, 137. Advocate General Jacobs buttresses his view by noting
that the draft text on monetary union proposed by the Commission in early 1991 to
help the Intergovernmental Conference deliberations suggested that the ECB have a
right of consultation whenever draft legislation concerned monetary, prudential super-
vision, banking or financial matters. See id. at 1-7196, 138.
113. Id. at 1-7197, 140.
114. Id. at 1-7197, 9 141. Advocate General Jacobs added a helpful dictum con-
cerning the value of informal consultation of the ECB, not rising to the level of formal
consultation of the ECB Governing Council under Article 105(4), whenever legislative
measures might affect the ECB's internal organization. Noting the possible application
of a "principle of institutional balance," he observed that it would be sufficient if ECB
staff would be offered an opportunity to express views before the measure would be
adopted-which in fact happened during the drafting of the OLAF Regulation. Id. at I-
7198, 1 144.
115. OLAF, Case C-11/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-7147, 1-7258-59; 1 110.
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Commission argued, not surprisingly, that the ECB's indepen-
dence was strictly "functional" ("fonctionnel") in character, lim-
ited to achievement of its specific control of monetary policy."1'
Investigations to curb fraud fall outside of ECB policy-making.
Moreover, the Commission contended that the ECB had not
provided any evidence that OLAF investigations of ECB internal
practices would cause any effective inhibition of the ECB's policy
making or decisional capacity.' 17
The ECB contended that its Treaty granted independence
had an absolute character, enabling it alone to set its internal
organization procedures and staff rules, which would include
procedural measures to guard against fraud. The ECB asserted
that EC Treaty Article 108 required that it be "shielded from all
sources of external influence."' The ECB followed through by
contending that OLAF investigations would constitute "external
influence" because they might create a risk of pressure upon
ECB Governing Council members, thus 'jeopardising their inde-
pendence when taking decisions."119
The ECB added a rather subtle secondary argument con-
cerning financial market risks that might be created by OLAF
investigations:
Economic agents, who may not be familiar with the institu-
tional structure of OLAF, might fear that the Commission is
given the possibility of influencing the ECB by exercising the
extensive powers of OLAF which .. .may be compared to
those of a criminal investigation. Thus, the application of
Regulation No. 1073/1999 might undermine the confidence
of the financial markets in the ECB and in the euro. 20
Advocate General Jacobs' analysis of ECB independence is
considerably more detailed than that of the Court and merits
close attention. He began by "consider[ing] the purpose and
the essential features" of the Treaty grant of independence to
the ECB. 21 He stressed that Article 108's bar to any "influence"
on the ECB is with specific regard to "the performance of its
tasks," leading to the conclusion that:
116. A.G. Jacobs OLAF Opinion, Case C-11/00, [2003] E.C.R. at 1-7199, 147.
117. Id. at 1-7199-7200, 1 147.
118. Id. at 1-7199, 146.
119. OLAF, Case C-11/00, [2003] E.C.R. at 1-7268, 118.
120. A.G. Jacobs OLAF Opinion, Case C-11/00, [2003] E.C.R. at 1-7199, 146.
121. Id. at 1-7200, 1 148.
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[T] he independence thus established is not an end in itself; it
serves a specific purpose. By shielding the decision-making
process of the ECB from short-term political pressures the
principle of independence aims to enable the ECB effectively
to pursue the aim of price stability and, without prejudice to
that aim, support the economic policies of the Community as
required by Article 105(1) EC.12 2
Within this more limited (implicitly functional) view of ECB
independence, Advocate General Jacobs endorsed the analytic
break down of the nature of ECB independence which the ECB
itself proposed. First, the ECB is "institutionally independent,"
mandated by the Treaty not to seek or accept instructions from
any Community institution. 12 3 The ECB has totally autonomous
regulatory and decision-making power within the monetary pol-
icy field set in EC Treaty Article 110 (subject, of course, to judi-
cial review).
Secondly, the ECB Executive Board and Governing Council
enjoy "a high level of personal independence."' 24 Executive
Board members serve a non-renewable eight year term and na-
tional governors at least a five year term. Executive Board mem-
bers serve a non-renewable eight year term and national gover-
nors at least a five year term. Both then have "[s] ecurity of ten-
ure," because Executive Board members can be removed for
"serious misconduct" or incapacity only in a Court ofJustice pro-
ceeding, and national Governors can be removed in national
proceedings only under "[e]qually strict conditions. '1125 Third,
the ECB is financially independent, setting its own budget and
obtaining its assets from national central banks, as well as having
its own autonomous accounting and audit procedures (the ECB
also generates its revenues from its own lending and clearing-
house operations, although the Advocate General does not men-
tion this). 1 26
After this useful summary, apt to be picked up by future
academics in appraising ECB independence, Advocate General
Jacobs concluded:
As is evident from this summary, the Treaty and the Statute
122. Id. at 1-7200, 149-50.
123. Id. at 1-7200-01, 152.
124. Id. at 1-7201, 153.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1-7201, 154.
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confer upon the ECB a high level of independence which is
equivalent to, or perhaps greater than, the independence of
the national central banks which prevailed prior to the re-
forms undertaken at national level in order to comply with
the requirements for entry into the Monetary Union. How-
ever, the principle of independence does not imply a total
isolation from, or a complete absence of cooperation with,
the institutions and bodies of the Community. The Treaty
prohibits only influence which is liable to undermine the abil-
ity of the ECB to carry our its tasks effectively with a view to
price stability, and which must therefore be regarded as un-
due.127
Advocate General Jacobs continued by stressing the demo-
cratic accountability of the ECB. Pursuant to EC Treaty Article
113, the President of the Council and a Commission member
may participate, without a vote, in Governing Council and Gen-
eral Council sessions, which implies that they "presumably have
the right to speak in order to influence, within reasonable limits,
the decision-making of the governing bodies of the ECB."'121 In-
deed, the Council President may even submit a motion for ECB
deliberation. The Parliament also "may exercise a degree of in-
fluence on the decision-making of the ECB" through its debate
on the ECB annual report and its committee sessions held to
hear the views of the ECB President or other Executive Board
members. 12
9
Note that the Advocate General does not hesitate to use the
term "influence" to describe the effect that these Treaty-sanc-
tioned Article 113 relationships might have upon the ECB, even
though Article 108 of the EC Treaty expressly instructs Commu-
nity political institutions "not to seek to influence the members
of the decision-making bodies of the ECB . .. in the perform-
ance of their tasks."1"' Advocate General Jacobs concluded by
observing that the Treaty grants the Council and the Parliament
legislative power in certain sectors that can regulate the subse-
quent exercise of ECB power in those sectors, e.g., the establish-
ment of substantive and procedural limits for ECB penalties
upon financial institutions, or the possible conferral of responsi-
127. Id. at 1-7202, 155.
128. Id. at 1-7202, 156.
129. Id.
130. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 108, O.J. C 325/33, at 77 (2002).
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bilities to the ECB in the sphere of prudential supervision of
credit institutions. 131
In view of this analysis, the Advocate General concluded
that the ECB concerns about any undue influence upon its pol-
icy or decision-making are illusory. He stressed that OLAF itself
has been given complete independence of the Commission and
that consequently:
[Its] institutional and legal arrangements guarantee OLAF a
substantial degree of operational independence although it
is set up within the Commission's administrative and budget-
ary structures. There is therefore in my view very little if any,
risk that OLAF could be used by the Commission, or by some
other institution or body, as a vehicle for putting political
pressure on the members of the governing bodies of the
ECB. 132
With regard to the ECB concern that financial market "eco-
nomic operators" might view OLAF investigations of the ECB as
implicating undue influence over the ECB, the Advocate Gen-
eral balances this potential risk by noting that:
[O]ther operators might feel reassured to know that, albeit
independent, the ECB is subject to the same system of exter-
nal, specialised and independent control of its financial deal-
ings as other Community institutions and bodies. Indeed, it
would seem to me that the reputation of the ECB might suf-
fer considerable damage if accusations of fraud directed at
members of its management or staff could not be cleared
through an investigation carried out by a body outside the
ECB itself.13
3
More decisively, even if the ECB could demonstrate that
OLAF investigations "would reduce market confidence in the
ECB to some extent," this would not warrant a finding that the
ECB should escape such investigations, because "[t]he ECB [is]
subject to the rule of law" which requires it to "conduct its affairs
lawfully and without fraud detrimental to the financial interests
of the Community. The application of Regulation No 1073/
1999 to the ECB aims to, and will in my view, assist the ECB in its
131. A.G. Jacobs OLAF Opinion, Case C-11/00, [2003] E.C.R. at 1-7202-03, 157.
132. Id. at 1-7205, 165. Advocate General Jacobs described aspects of OLAF's
structure that reinforced its operational independence. Id. at 1-7204, 163.
133. See id. at 1-7206, 170.
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efforts to ensure that that obligation is, and is seen to be,
respected." 134
The Court of Justice's judgment analyzed the scope of the
ECB's independence in essentially the same manner as did Ad-
vocate General Jacobs. Recognizing the importance of the issue,
the Court devoted several pages, thirty-two paragraphs in all, to
the subject. 135 The Court initially set out the contentions of the
Central Bank, noting in particular the ECB's concern that OLAF
investigations might bring "pressure" on members of the Gov-
erning Council or Executive Board, thereby 'jeopardizing their
independence when taking decisions."' 36 The Court also ob-
served the ECB's concern that even the appearance of possible
pressure could reduce "the complete confidence of unstable fi-
nancial markets."13
7
The Court's findings began by stressing that "the draftsmen
of the EC Treaty clearly intended to ensure that the ECB should
be in a position to carry out independently the tasks conferred
upon it by the Treaty."13 Then, however, the Court delimited
the scope of ECB independence, specifically citing Advocate
General Jacobs:
Article 108 EC seeks, in essence, to shield the ECB from all
political pressure in order to enable it effectively to pursue
the objectives attributed to its tasks, through the independent
exercise of the specific powers conferred on it for that pur-
pose by the EC Treaty and the ESCB Statute.' 39
The Court's position can plausibly be read as endorsing the
Commission's contention that ECB independence is "strictly
functional and limited to the performance of [its] specific
[Treaty assigned] tasks." 4 0
The Court expressly rejected any absolutist view of the
ECB's Treaty-granted or independence, declaring that:
[R] ecognition that the ECB has such independence does not
have the consequence of separating it entirely from the Euro-
pean Community and exempting it from every rule of Com-
134. See id. at 1-7208, 174.
135. OLAF, Case C-11/00, [2003] E.C.R 1-7147, 7259-68, 113-45.
136. Id. at 1-7261, 118.
137. Id. at 1-7261, 1 119.
138. Id. at 1-7264, 1 130.
139. Id. at 1-7265, 134.
140. Id. at 1-7263, 126.
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munity law. The ECB is, on the conditions laid down by the
EC Treaty and the ESCB Statute, subject to various kinds of
Community controls, notably review by the Court of Justice
and control by the Court of Auditors. Finally, it is evident
that it was not the intention of the Treaty draftsmen to shield
the ECB from any kind of legislative action taken by the Com-
munity legislature... 141
The Court also observed that the Community legislature has the
power to adopt "legislative measures capable of applying to the
ECB" whenever the Treaty authorizes them.' 4 2
Turning specifically to OLAF's exercise of its investigatory
power, the Court rejected the ECB contention that such investi-
gations might undermine its independent control of monetary
policy. The Court stressed OLAF's independence from the
Commission and its limited power to investigate possible "fraud
or corruption," rather than to carry out any broader form of fi-
nancial control. 4 ' Finally the Court considered that any "eco-
nomic operators" that would be "upset" by an appearance of any
loss in ECB independence merely suffer from "a lack of informa-
tion" or fail "to see the real picture."144
V. REFLECTIONS UPON THE JUDGMENT AND ADVOCATE
GENERAL JACOBS' OPINION
Consideration of the analysis undertaken by Advocate Gen-
eral Jacobs and the subsequent reasoning of the Court's judg-
ment suggests to the present author several reflections or com-
ments. The first is that the Court has implicitly, and the Advo-
cate General expressly, rejected an absolutist view of ECB
independence rooted in any highly autonomous "Community
within the Community" theory of the ECB's nature and status.
Secondly, the Advocate General has directly, and the Court im-
plicitly, stressed the ECB's subordination to the rule of law
within the Community. Third, both the Advocate General and
the Court have defined the independence of the ECB as essen-
tially functional in character, limited to its control of monetary
policy and related tasks. They expressly rejected any concern
141. Id. at 1-7265, 135.
142. Id. at 1-7266, 139.
143. Id. at 1-7267, 141.
144. Id. at 1-7268, 144.
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that OLAF investigations into internal affairs of the ECB pose
any genuine risk to the ECB's role in functional monetary policy-
making. Fourth, the Advocate General and the Court have pro-
vided a useful mode for evaluating when the ECB should have
the right to be consulted during a Community legislative pro-
cess. Finally, Advocate General Jacobs' opinion has promoted
the value of legitimate democratic accountability of the ECB, en-
dorsing appropriate, rather than "undue," influence from the
EC political institutions.
The first reflection emphasizes the constitutional impor-
tance of the OLAFjudgment. As indicated in the prior discus-
sion concerning the recent debate on the constitutional nature
and status of the ECB itself, Chiara Zilioli and Martin Selmayer
have advocated an intrinsically autonomous constitutional status
for the ECB, essentially "a new supranational organization"
within the European Union, a "new Community" associated with
but independent of the European Community.145 Given the ex-
pertise of the authors and the strong tradition of respect for cen-
tral bank autonomy among many members of the academic
community, this theory has enjoyed considerable respect, even
though vigorously contested by other academic commentators.
To some degree, the fact that the detailed provisions governing
Monetary Union and the status, powers and duties of the Central
Bank were inserted into the text of the EC Treaty and related
Protocols, rather than placing them in Community legislation,
supports this sort of constitutional analysis.
The Court implicitly rejected this theory when it concluded
that the ECB is a body within the European Community and sub-
ject to Community law, so that the OLAF Regulation's grant of
power to OLAF to execute investigations in any Community
body or agency would encompass internal investigations of the
ECB.14 6 Advocate General Jacobs rejected the theory in strong
and clearly expressed terms, worth quoting again:
The ECB is subject to the general principles of law which
form part of Community law and promotes the goals of the
Community set out in Article 2 EC though the implementa-
tion of the tasks and duties laid upon it. It may therefore be
described as the Central Bank of the European Community;
145. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
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it would be inaccurate to characterize it, as have some writers,
as an organisation which is 'independent of the European
Community', a 'Community within the Community', a 'new
Community' or, indeed, as something falling outside the no-
tion of a body established by, or on the basis of, the EC Treaty
in Regulation No 10763/1999.147
The Court's judgment and Advocate General Jacobs' opin-
ion accordingly place the ECB "squarely within the Community
framework"14 and legal order in a constitutional sense. This
certainly agrees with the prevailing and most commonsense view
of the status of the ECB. 149 Properly analyzed, the ECB is a Com-
munity organ, regardless of its unique power in monetary policy,
and not some supranational autonomous body created by a di-
rect cession of sovereignty from the Member States by terms of
the EC Treaty. Although the ECB does derive its mandate, goal,
structure and fundamental role from express Treaty provisions,
rather than from Council and/or Parliament and Council legis-
lation, other Treaty provisions clearly enable Community legisla-
tion or guidelines that provide structure or content to certain
ECB operations or regulate the manner in which the ECB car-
ries out operations.1"'
The ECB itself, however, may well have begun to consider
that it possessed the absolutist autonomy argued for in the "new
supranational organization" or "Community within a Commu-
nity" theory. That would be pernicious, because, as we shall fur-
ther observe in discussing the democratic accountability of the
Central Bank, it is vital that the ECB recognize that its monetary
policy-making and regulatory powers should be exercised within
the context of the Community political and legal structure.
In particular, even though under Article 105 the ECB's "pri-
mary objective [is] to maintain price stability," that Article also
147. A.G.Jacobs OLAF Opinion, Case C-11/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-7155, 1-7175, 60.
148. OLAF, Case C-11/00, [2003] E.C.R. at 1-7254, 92.
149. Jean-Victor Louis, the eminent Belgian professor and former General Coun-
sel to the Bank of Belgium, endorses Advocate General Jacobs' analysis, and the rejec-
tion of the theory advocated by Zilioli and Selmayr, in Jean-Victor Louis, The Economic
and Monetary Union: Law and Institutions, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 575, 599-602 (2004).
He cites a major lecture by Rene Smits on June 4, 2003 as also situating the ECB as an
organ within the Community. Id. at 600. Two of the case notes on the OLAFjudgment
applaud the rejection of the Zilioli and Selmayr thesis. See Lavranos, supra note 1, at
119-21; see also Odudu, supra note 1, at 1080-83.
150. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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mandates the ECB to "support the general economic policies of
the Community. "151 The Community political institutions-Par-
liament, Council, and Commission-naturally determine these
"general economic policies." We may yet see a certain evolution
in the determination of the proper stress to be placed on "price
stability" versus an economic policy concentration on achieving
a better rate of GDP growth or a reduction in unemployment.1
52
The Euro-group, composed of the Finance Ministers of the
Euro-zone States,1 53 headed by their newly-chosen President,
Prime Minister Junckers of Luxembourg, 154 would like to
achieve some form of mutual consultation or collaboration with
the ECB, linking the Euro-group's coordination of its various
States' economic policies with the ECB's control of monetary
policy. The ECB's reaction has been to emphasize its total au-
tonomy. 55 We may yet see another "turf battle" arising out of
some form of confrontation between the ECB and the Euro-
group, especially if the draft Constitution or some other Treaty
amendment should grant the Euro-group the power to adopt le-
gally binding decisions or guidelines in the field of economic
coordination.
Secondly, Advocate General Jacobs' emphasis on the ECB's
subordination to "the rule of law," implicitly followed in the
151. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 105, O.J. C 325/33, at 75 (2002).
152. The author has previously expressed the view that the Treaty of Amsterdam's
amendment of the EC Treaty to insert a Title on Employment, including an express
mandate in Article 127(2) that "[t] he objective of a high level of employment" must be
considered in all Community policies, might, and perhaps should, impact the ECB's
control of monetary policy within the Euro-zone. See Goebel, supra note 9, at 299-300.
153. The European Council meeting at Luxembourg in December 1997 author-
ized the Ministers of Finance of the States participating in the Euro-zone to meet infor-
mally within the Ecofin Council to discuss policy issues concerning them, but without
any power to take legally binding decisions, which remains solely in the competence of
the Ecofin Council. See E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 18 (1997). These Euro-zone Ministers of
Finance are now commonly known as the Euro-group. It is worth noting that the draft
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe would have significantly enhanced the
role of the Euro-group Finance Ministers by granting them the power to adopt legally
binding measures and economic guidelines within the Euro-zone. A Protocol would
have authorized the informal Euro-group meetings and mandated the election of a
President for the Euro-group for a term of two and a half years.
154. Optimistically anticipating the eventual ratification of the draft Constitution,
in August 2004 the Euro-group Finance Ministers chose Prime MinisterJuncker of Lux-
embourg, who also acts as his State's Finance Minister, to serve as their initial President,
presumably until the end of 2006.
155. See Ralph Atkins & Mark Schieritz, ECB Warns Finance Ministers It Will Retain
Sole Control of Euro, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 27, 2004, at 6.
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Court judgment, is worth underlining. This links directly to the
status and role of the ECB discussed above.
Advocate General Jacobs addressed this topic twice. Ini-
tially, he dealt with the ECB contention that its Treaty-granted
status is so distinct that the OLAF Regulation should not be con-
sidered to apply to it. The Advocate General replied that the
Treaty draftsmen deliberately rejected the approach of making
Monetary Union a separate and distinct pillar under the Treaty
on European Union, but rather integrated it within the EC
Treaty.' 56 In his view, it follows that "the ECB is-in accordance
with the principle of the rule of law enshrined in Article 6 of the
Treaty on European Union-bound by Community law. . .. ""'
Accordingly, "[t] he ECB is subject to the general principles of
law which form part of Community law." '158
Later, Advocate General Jacobs makes use of this funda-
mental principle when rebutting the ECB contention that mar-
ket operators might be concerned about any apparent diminu-
tion in ECB independence due to an OLAF investigation. Even
assuming that an investigation "would reduce market confi-
dence" (certainly not an implausible hypothesis), the Advocate
General concludes this to be decisively outweighed because the
ECB is "subject to the rule of law" and must "conduct its affairs
lawfully and without fraud."'159
This stress on the subjection of the ECB to the "rule of law"
may well prove a valuable precedent in other contexts. As noted
above in considering the nature of judicial review of ECB acts,
the Court may well have occasion to examine the ECB's level of
discretion and obligation to provide a reasoned basis for its deci-
sions in a regulatory context.160 Also, in the long run, there may
arise other "turf battles" between the ECB and Community polit-
ical institutions, or the ECB and national governments or na-
tional central banks, in which the Court will have to ensure that
the law is observed. It must always be remembered that even
though the ECB is an extremely powerful technocratic body, its
156. See supra text accompanying note 98.
157. A.G. Jacobs OLAF Opinion, Case C-11/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-7155, 7174-75,
59.
158. Id. at 1-7175, 60.
159. Id. at 1-7208, 174.
160. See supra text accompanying note 68.
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policies, acts and decisions are circumscribed by its subjection to
the rule of law within the Community.
Third, Advocate General Jacobs and the Court manifestly
limit the independence of the ECB to its functional or opera-
tional role in the determination of monetary policy, conduct of
exchange rate operations, supervision of the Euro, promotion of
payment systems and related matters. 16' These are the "tasks"
which the Treaty authorizes the ECB to execute in Articles 105
and 106.162 Accordingly, the independence accorded by Article
108 to the ECB is limited to the mode in which the ECB executes
these tasks. 1 63 This teleological analysis of the ECB indepen-
dence may not eliminate the risk of future debate concerning
the demarcation of ECB independence, 64 but it certainly
achieves considerable and valuable clarity.
Advocate General Jacobs' analysis of ECB independence
into the categories of institutional independence of its bodies,
personal independence of its members, and budgetary and fi-
nancial independence 16 5 is apt to be followed by academic com-
mentators. Rene Smits and other earlier commentators ana-
lyzed ECB independence into somewhat different structural cat-
egories but are largely in accord.'66
Further, the Court's definitive rejection of the ECB concern
that OLAF investigations could somehow pose a risk to its mone-
tary policy-making or regulatory decision-making merits some re-
flections. Neither Advocate General Jacobs nor the Court gave
much credence to the likelihood that an anti-fraud investigation
161. See supra text accompanying notes 121-122, 138-139.
162. See supra note 20.
163. See supra text accompanying note 122.
164. For example, the Court ofJustice might have to determine the degree of ECB
independence in the conduct of foreign exchange operations under EC Treaty Article
105(2) in the event that the Council should decide to "formulate general orientations
for exchange rate policies" pursuant to Article 111 (2). This is by no means a totally
unlikely hypothesis-suppose, for example, that at a time when the Euro rises sharply
in value in comparison to the US Dollar, the Ecofin Council wants the ECB to intervene
on the foreign exchange markets to moderate or retard the Euro's rise, while the ECB
Governing Council would prefer a non-intervention policy.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 123-126.
166. See AMTENBRINK, supra note 9, at 18-22 (categorizing ECB independence as
institutional, functional, organizational and financial); see also SMITS, supra note 9, at
162-68 (analyzing ECB independence into categories of institutional, personal, func-
tional and financial).
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could ever pose such a risk.167
More recent news developments in two national arenas sug-
gest that the ECB might have some justification for its view.
First, in early 2004 Ernst Welteke, President of the Bundesbank,
was severely criticized following media revelations of his accept-
ance of a luxury hotel stay for four nights, costing US$9330, paid
for by a commercial bank.168 Mr. Welteke contended that ac-
ceptance of the hotel accommodations during a bank-sponsored
conference was not inappropriate.1 69 The media revelations led
to an investigation by Frankfurt prosecutors. When Welteke re-
signed, he asserted that "[t]he independence of the
Bundesbank" had been "flouted" by pressure placed upon him
to resign. 7 ° Note that the investigation, coupled with popular
discredit in the media and pressure from the German Finance
Ministry, induced Welteke to resign, even though the
Bundesbank itself had not considered there were adequate rea-
sons for Welteke's dismissal.171 One can certainly hypothesize
that at a time when a central bank governor might be pursuing
unpopular monetary policies, the threat of an investigation for
relatively minor financial misconduct or breach of internal ad-
ministrative rules could be used to exert pressure for a shift in
monetary policies.
An even better example of a governmental use of an investi-
gation to try to influence a central bank is currently occurring in
Poland. As a consequence of the merger between a large Italian
bank, Unicredito, and a German bank, HVB, Unicredito would
normally take over control of an HVB banking subsidiary in Po-
land. The recently elected populist government in Poland has
vigorously opposed this, fearing that the Unicredito acquisition
of the Polish bank would seriously augment the already high
level of foreign control over the Polish banking sector.'7 2 The
Polish central bank exercises bank supervision powers. Its Presi-
dent Balcerowicz declared that the Banks' Banking Supervisory
167. See supra text accompanying notes 132, 143.
168. See Bertrand Benoit, Bundesbank Is Losing Last of Its Mystique, FIN. TIMES
(London), Apr. 8, 2004, at 10.
169. See id.
170. See Katrin Bennhold, Bundesbank Chief Resigns Amid Scandal N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
17, 2004, at C3.
171. See id.
172. See Jan Cienski, UniCredit Broke Polish Law, Says Treasury Minister, FIN. TIMES
(London), Mar. 8, 2006, at 12.
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Commission would execute a totally independent review of the
bank acquisition. The Polish government summoned Balcer-
owicz to Parliament to explain his conduct of the Commission's
initial proceedings.1 7 3 The government then announced that a
Parliamentary inquiry would investigate the role and policies of
the central bank ever since its creation.174 This was widely inter-
preted as a barely hidden effort to exert pressure on President
Balcerowicz and the central bank with regard to its review of the
Unicredito's indirect acquisition of a Polish bank. Jean-Claude
Trichet, President of the ECB, warned with "great, great gravity"
that Polish central bank independence was of "extreme impor-
tance."1 75 A Financial Times editorial even urged the Polish gov-
ernment, "Do Not Browbeat Your Central Bank, Warsaw."1 76
Fortunately, the most recent news reports indicate that the Po-
lish government and Unicredito appear to have arranged a com-
promise solution, but it is still uncertain what will happen to the
Parliamentary inquiry. 177
If these instances tend to show that outside investigations
could in particular instances be employed to exert influence on
central bank decision-making, does that invalidate the analyses
made in the Court judgment and Advocate General Jacob's
opinion? No, because both stressed that OLAF was organically
and functionally independent of the Commission, the Parlia-
ment and Council. 178 This demonstrates the wisdom of the ini-
tial Commission Decision creating OLAF as an absolutely inde-
pendent body. It is certainly implausible that OLAF's executive
board would have any motive to modify ECB policy or decision-
making by undertaking, or threatening to undertake, an investi-
gation. Hypothetically, however, if the Parliament should open
a committee investigation into some allegations of misconduct
by an ECB Executive Board member or members at a time when
173. See Jan Cienski, Polish Conflict on Bank Merger Worsens UniCredit, FIN. TIMES
(London), Mar. 11, 2006, at 3.
174. See Ralph Atkins et al., Europe Frets as Poland Heads Down Populist Path, FIN.
TIMES (London), Mar. 15, 2006, at 6.
175. Jan Cienski, Polish Bank Chief Hits Back at Government Protectionism, FIN. TIMES
(London), Mar. 14, 2006, at 4.
176. Editorial, Do Not Browbeat Your Central Bank, Warsaw, FIN. TIMES (London),
Mar. 20, 2006, at 12.
177. See Mark Landler, Poland Averts Clash with Europe Over Italian Bank Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2006, at C6.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 132, 143.
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the Parliament's monetary committee is manifestly unhappy with
current ECB monetary policies, the situation might be different.
The coincidence in timing would raise a legitimate concern that
the investigation might be motivated by a desire to pressure the
ECB into modifying its policies.
Fourth, Advocate General Jacobs, followed by the Court, has
provided useful guidance in determining when the ECB ought
to be consulted during a Community legislative process. The re-
cord indicates that the ECB has indeed been properly consulted
since 1998 whenever the Council has adopted measures relating
either to Monetary Union or the introduction of the euro cur-
rency or coins. 1 7 9 The OLAF case thus represents the first "turf
battle" in this context.
Although it is not particularly likely that the issue will arise
again, the guidelines suggested by Advocate General Jacobs may
well help to settle any debate between the Council and the ECB
during the course of legislative drafting, thereby avoiding any
Court proceeding. If, for example, a draft legislative measure in
the financial sector were to limit or curb the prudential supervi-
sion over banks exercised by national central banks there might
be some uncertainty whether the ECB ought to be consulted be-
cause of some indirect impact of the draft legislation upon the
operations of the European System of Central Banks. Until the
ECB actually has been given the power of prudential supervision
of banks within the Euro-zone (which the Treaty authorizes the
Council to grant to the ECB, 8 0 but without any Council action
to date), the field of prudential supervision of banks is not
within the ECB's competence. Hence, under Advocate General
Jacobs' analysis, the ECB would not have to be consulted.
The final reflection to be made is that Advocate General
179. See, e.g., the references to the ECB opinions obtained in the legislative proce-
dure leading to the adoption of Council Regulation No. 2532/98 concerning ECB sanc-
tions, supra note 67; see also Council Regulation No. 1338/2001, O.J. L 181/6 (2001)
(adopting policies protecting the euro against counterfeiting); European Parliament
and Council Regulation No. 2560/2001, O.J. L 344/13 (2001) (adopting rules to gov-
ern the transfer of money across Member States). Indeed, one might contend that the
Regulation on cross-border Euro payments concerned only financial operations within
the internal market, so that formal consultation of the ECB might not even have been
compulsory. Of course, if the ECB had not been consulted, it might have challenged
the procedure under Article 230 as a violation of its prerogatives. EC Treaty, supra note
4, art. 230, O.J. C 325/33, at 126 (2002).
180. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 105(6), O.J. C 325/33, at 76 (2002).
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Jacobs has promoted the concept of the proper democratic ac-
countability of the ECB. The Court of Justice did not have occa-
sion to deal with this topic.
Although the ECB has an extraordinary level of autonomy
in its control of monetary policy, it is by no means exempt from
democratic accountabilityl 8 1-the obligation to explain and per-
haps defend its actions and views to the political institutions,
namely the Commission, the Ecofin Council and particularly the
Parliament. This was foreseen early in the planning for EMU.
The Delors Report mentions the need for modes of accountabil-
ity immediately after its coverage of independence.1 8 2 The Com-
mission in a March 1990 report urged that the central monetary
body must be "democratically accountable [as] a necessary com-
plement to its independence in order to make its policies accept-
able to the public at large. 18 3
What of the Parliament? On April 2, 1998, Parliament
adopted a prominent resolution on the democratic accountabil-
ity of the ECB.184 Parliament stressed that "the independence of
the future ECB will only meet with public acceptance if the ECB
enjoys a high degree of legitimacy [which requires] full account-
ability of the ECB for its actions. ''185 The Parliament further
noted that such accountability was essential to balance the inde-
pendence of the ECB, which goes further than that of any prior
central bank. 186
Even commentators who have strongly endorsed the highest
level of independence for the ECB have recognized the need to
balance this with democratic accountability. Thus, Rene Smits
urged that the ECB should be subject to accountable indepen-
dence, particularly in its relations with the Parliament.187 Even
Zilioli and Selmayr accepted that it is appropriate for the ECB to
181. See generally AMTENBRINK, supra note 9 (presenting the most detailed coverage
of this topic, making an analysis of different aspects of accountability as such, and pro-
viding a comparative study of all leading central banks as well as the ECB).
182. DELORS REPORT, supra note 11, at 26-27.
183. European Commission, Working Paper on Economic and Monetary Union:
Economic Rationale and Design of the System (Mar. 1990), summarized in E.C. BULL.,
no. 3, at 8-9 (1990).
184. See European Parliament Resolution on Democratic Accountability in the
Third Phase of EMU of 2 April 1998, O.J. C 138/177 (1998).
185. Id. at 177, C.
186. See id. at 178, 4.
187. See SMITS, supra note 9, at 169.
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strive to "promote transparency and accountability in its daily
work," notably citing the ECB's voluntary appearance before Par-
liamentary committees every calendar quarter to report on
ongoing monetary policy. 188
Academic commentators who are particularly disturbed by
what is called the "democratic deficit" of the Central Bank (as I
am) place even more stress on the necessity for strong forms of
democratic accountability, particularly to the Parliament as the
elected representative of the people. 8 9 Early on, Professors Gor-
mley and de Haan forcefully contended that the ECB was not
adequately subject to a high level of democratic accountability in
order to justify its independence, stating "that the democratic
accountability of the ECB is poorly arranged in comparison" to
that of other central banks.' 90 In their reply to the views of
Zilioli and Selmayr, Professors Amtenbrink and de Haan con-
tended that the "relationship between the democratically elected
government and the central bank translates into a principal-
agent relationship."19' Accordingly, they argued that "delega-
tion of powers to non-elected officials can only be acceptable in
a democratic society if central banks are one way or another ac-
countable to democratically elected institutions."192
The Central Bank itself has not denied the desirability of
democratic accountability. To the contrary, its spokesmen, nota-
bly its initial President Duisenberg, have claimed that it strives
for accountability and transparency. 93 Otmar Issing, the Execu-
tive Board member most noted for monetary expertise, has even
claimed that the ECB is among the most transparent of all cen-
tral banks, highly accountable to the Community, political insti-
tutions and the public, especially the financial sector. 94
188. See Zilioli & Selmayr, supra note 50, at 641-42.
189. See Goebel, supra note 9, at 294-95.
190. De Haan & Gormley, supra note 43, at 343, 352-53.
191. Amtenbrink & de Haan, supra note 59, at 66.
192. Id. at 73.
193. See Willem F. Duisenberg, Presentation of the ECB's Annual Report 1998 to
the European Parliament (Oct. 26, 1999), available at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/
date/1999/html/sp991026_l.en.html. In this initial annual report, President
Duisenberg devoted considerable space to describing the ECB modes of providing in-
formation to Parliament and the public under the heading, "Accountability and Trans-
parency of the ECB."
194. See Otmar Issing, The Eurosystem: Transparent and Accountable or 'Willem in Euro-
land', 37J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 503, 505-06 (1999).
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Nonetheless, those concerned about this issue may well feel
that the ECB is strongly motivated to provide rapid and reliable
information about its monetary policies, but not particularly en-
thused to receive, or apt to reflect earnestly about viewpoints or
advice provided to it. In one famous exchange, after Oskar La
Fontaine, then the German Minister for Economics and Fi-
nance, had urged that ECB monetary policy be more designed
to promote growth and employment, President Duisenberg re-
sponded by saying that "[i] t's normal for the political side to give
suggestions or opinions, but it would be abnormal if these sug-
gestions were listened to."195 Indeed, in reading the transcripts
of the quarterly presentations made by Presidents Duisenberg or
Trichet to the Parliament, one may well have the feeling that
they answer questions, but do not listen sufficiently to the MEPs'
views when stated, or when they are implicit in the questions.
Within this context, Advocate General Jacobs' observations
on the proper dimension of the democratic accountability of the
ECB take on considerable importance. Given EC Treaty Article
108's interdiction of any "influence" on the ECB by Community
political institutions, it may be hard in practice to draw the line
between permissible advice and commentary and impermissible
pressure.
Advocate General Jacobs effectively endorses legitimate "in-
fluence" by the Council President or a Commission member
(usually the Commissioner responsible for the Economics port-
folio) when they attend the ECB Governing Council sessions, as
well as by MEPs during hearings of the ECB President or other
representative. 96 Even if the views or comments are intended to
affect or modify ECB decision-making, he considers them to be
appropriate.
Advocate GeneralJacobs' recognized expertise in legal anal-
ysis may thus serve to buttress the views of academic and media
commentators who stress the desirability of greater influence
upon the ECB by Community political institutions (or by the
Euro-group of Ministers of Finance of Euro-zone States, to the
extent it has acquired a customary status in coordinating eco-
nomic policy among those States), and the desirability of a
195. See Edmund L. Andrews, Hard Money for a Softer Europe; Leftist Politics Compli-
cates the Job of the Euro's Banker, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at C1.
196. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
2006] 653
FORDHAM INTERNA TIONAL LAWJOURNAL
greater willingness of ECB members to listen with appropriate
respect to these views.197 The line between "due" and "undue"
influence should, and perhaps may be shifted a bit in the direc-
tion of enhanced democratic accountability.
CONCLUSION
This Article's primary purpose has been to focus attention
on aspects of the OLAFjudgment, and Advocate General Jacob's
opinion, that have advanced understanding of the constitutional
nature of the ECB and of the parameters of its independence.
In the academic study of Community law, Monetary Union is all
too often viewed as the preserve of specialists-usually econo-
mists or political scientists-without any significant interest to a
broader audience. The OLAFjudgment merits wider attention
for its constitutional features, not merely its operational conse-
quences for the ECB.
The Article's secondary objective, of course, has been to fo-
cus attention on the skill exhibited by a distinguished Advocate
General, Francis Jacobs, breaking ground in a field remote from
those in which he has acquired a reputation for his legal exper-
tise. His excellent analysis in the OLAF proceeding not only
greatly benefited the Court, but provides a valuable source of
reflection and inspiration for academic commentators.
197. See Antenbrink & de Haan, supra note 59, at 72-76.
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